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Abstract 
Memories regarding the history of the Second Sino‐Japanese War  (1931‐1945) and World War II (1939‐1945) have always 
been  refreshed  in  the minds of  contemporaries  through  the retelling of  “historical war  stories”  in various  forms  including 
books,  posters,  films  and  other media  presentations.  However,  these  retellings  are  often  criticised  by  some  academics  as 
distortion of historical facts. This is because many of the present generation of readers and audiences were not even born at 
the time the events happened. Thus, “historical facts” of this era are, in reality, very vague in people’s minds and their “facts” 
are often simply a construction of  frequently retold “historical war stories” mixed with  imagination. This article will argue 
that even immediately after the end of both wars in 1945, fresh history memory was already distorted, with China being the 
main victim. Following the end of World War II, there was an extensive publication of books and periodicals about the war. 
However, through varied interpretations of primary sources and use of visual materials in different ways, various positions 
were  created  to  suit  specific  needs  for  justification  of  China’s  desire  to  be  part  of  the  camp  of world  powers  after  1945. 
Similar diverse positions were also used to make political arguments criticising both the Axis and Allied Powers for working 
toward different political ends.   
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Historical writings and commentaries on the 
responsibility of Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese 
War have always provoked controversies between 
China and Japan. The publication of New History 
Textbook by Fusosha Publishing in 2001 claimed that 
the Japanese invasion of Asian countries during 
World War II as the “Greater East Asia War” implied 
that the war was the liberation of Asians from the 
colonial rule of Europe and U.S. The textbook also 
did not mention the war crimes which the Japanese 
armies committed in China like forcing Chinese 
women to be sex slaves, or so-called “comfort 
women”, for Japanese soldiers. The term “Nanking 
Massacre” was also changed in the textbook to 
“Nanking Incident” in order to tone down the crime 
of massacring Chinese civilians. Finally,  the textbook 
was accepted by the Japanese Ministry of Education 
in 2005 which provoked a great protest from China 
and South Korea that condemned the book’s favoring 
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of Japan’s military expansion in the early World War 
II political atmosphere (Bu 2009). The visiting of 
Yasukuni Shrine, where World War II class A war 
criminals of Japan are worshiped by Japanese 
premiers and councilors, was also condemned by the 
Chinese government which said that its Japanese 
counterpart did not have a “rightful understanding” of 
history. The different interpretations of the Second 
Sino-Japanese War by both sides become the key 
factor leading to the ups and downs of Sino-Japanese 
relations in recent years.  
There are various previous historical studies 
regarding the political legacies of World War II. For 
historians of West Europe, their studies of the origin 
of totalitarianism in the inter-war period provided 
them the answers about the way of dealing with new 
totalitarian threat from Soviet Union in the post-war 
era (Bosworth 1993). While the Chinese government 
has, since the 1980s, made international political use 
of the Japanese history textbook controversy as the 
“history card” to oppose Japan’s increase in defense 
spending and its seeking of a permanent seat in the 
United Nations Security Council (Roy 2009). Besides, 
literature works on the Second Sino-Japanese War, 
which were published from the late 1940s to 1970s on 
both sides of Taiwan Strait, also showed ideological 
dichotomy between the Nationalists (KMT) and the 
Communists (CCP) of China (Tsung 1997). 
Williamsen (1998) also had a comprehensive 
annotated bibliographical essay on English academic 
works about the war publishing from the 1950s to 
1990s.   
As told in famous quotation of Italian philosopher 
Benedetto Croce: “all history is contemporary history” 
(Le Goff 1992), this article attempts to scatter the dust 
over historical narrative of Second Sino-Japanese War 
and World War II by focusing analysis on Chinese 
historical writings on the wars published from 1945 to 
1949. It was during this period that the memories 
regarding the wars were fresh in Chinese people’s 
minds and narratives were relatively less distorted by 
political ideology compared to more recent memories 
obtained after the post-war rise of patriotism in China. 
Apart from the reflection of the different ideologies of 
KMT and CCP toward international relations during 
the cold-war period, the elements emphasizing the 
China’s position as “victim”, “peaceful nation”, 
“laggard of economic development” within the 
historical narrative, also became the distant historical 
origin of the Chinese government’s “peaceful rise” 
(heping jueqi) diplomacy and “development is 
fundamental truth” (fazhan shi ying daoli) in the 
twenty-first century.  
JUSTIFICATION OF CHINESE POSITION: 
CHINESE HISTORICAL WRITING ON 
WORLD WAR II   
One of the main reasons why Chinese authors were 
eager to publish historical works on World War II 
was to present a Chinese interpretation about what 
had just happened in an event in which China itself 
had participated. This argument was well illustrated 
by Chu Yukun, in the preface to his book, The 
History of the World War II, which was written on 
April 15, 1945, in Shanghai, even before the end of 
the war.  
I start to write this book in the time of darkness. I regard 
this work as “devoting myself to the country through literary 
works”. Regarding the period of the war of resistance, it was 
a holy enterprise that was of equal importance to the rest of 
the war effort. Therefore, I consider finishing this book as 
my only spiritual consolation and my biggest mission when I 
stayed in Japanese-occupied territory. As a result, I had a 
noble ambition when writing this book in the time of 
darkness—that it be published immediately once victory is 
achieved, so that it will not only be the first book published 
in the nation, but also the first published in the world. The 
publishing industry of our nation in the past always relied on 
books written by foreigners, especially those in the field of 
international relations, most of which were translated works. 
From the outbreak of the European War [i.e., the invasion of 
Poland in 1939], I determined to write such a book to set a 
new example for our nation’s publishing industry. (Chu 
1946) 
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In this regard, Chu started to collect materials 
regarding World War II and write his book from 
September 1, 1939 to December 8, 1941, when the 
Pacific War began. However, once Shanghai was 
occupied by Japanese force, all international news 
agencies stationed in Shanghai lost their freedom and 
could not report any news regarding the war that was 
free from censorship by the Japanese authorities. As a 
result, what the newspapers reported in Shanghai was 
Japanese propaganda rather than accurate news 
reportage of the war, and it could not be used as 
source material to write the book. At that time, Chu 
still worked at the French news agency, Agence Havas, 
so he only received true information regarding the 
course of the European War through reading 
“confidential reports” in secret.  
Under these circumstances, Chu’s book only 
covered the war in Europe while the history of the 
Pacific War in the Far East was almost wholly 
neglected. Chu wanted to write another book on the 
history of China’s war of resistance, but did not have 
the time to do so because he needed to take charge of 
the business of Wen Hui Bao, a Chinese left-wing 
newspaper and his teaching duties in universities in 
Shanghai (Chu 1946).  
One of the key meetings, which officially marked 
the peace settlement after World War II, was the 
Potsdam Conference. The conference was attended by 
the three major powers: the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and 
Britain, which were represented by Joseph Stalin, 
Harry S. Truman and Winston Churchill, and later 
Churchill’s successor Clement Attlee respectively, 
from July 17 to August 2, 1945. One of the main 
conference decisions relating to China was the 
announcement of the Potsdam Declaration issued by 
Truman, Churchill and the chairman of the Nationalist 
Government of China, Chiang Kai-shek on July 26, 
1945, concerning the terms of Japan’s surrender in the 
foreseeable end of the war. Therefore, many narratives 
and commentaries by authors on the history of World 
War II reflected different views regarding China’s 
position in the world in relation to the peace 
settlements and the international power structure, 
dominated by Western powers.  
The secret agreement between the U.S.S.R., the 
U.S. and Britain, which granted the control of Darlin 
(Dalian) and Port Arthur in the Liaodong Peninsula 
and the privileges of railways in southern Manchuria 
to the U.S.S.R. in exchange for the declaration of war 
against Japan 90 days after the defeat of Nazi 
Germany, was in fact made during the earlier Yalta 
Conference held in February 1945. The details of this 
conference were not known to the Chinese 
government and thus the Chinese common people. 
Therefore, the Yalta conference was not covered in 
most of the historical works written by Chinese 
authors during the period between 1945 and 1949. 
Chu wrote in his book that during the early part of the 
Potsdam Conference, the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and 
Britain decided “a certain type of secret agreement” 
under which the latter two agreed to transfer the 
territories in the southern part of the Sakhalin and 
Kuril Islands to the U.S.S.R. from Japan, while the 
question of Darlin and Port Arthur was to be solved 
by direct negotiation between the governments of the 
U.S.S.R. and China. Chu’s book did not condemn 
such a secret agreement which ignored the right of 
China’s government to participate in the Yalta 
Conference, as many Chinese critics said later. Instead, 
Chu justified the need to keep the agreement secret 
because Japan, had it known of this agreement, would 
have launched an offensive attack before the Red 
Army of the U.S.S.R. had been dispatched to the Far 
East (Chu 1946).  
The Pictorial History of the World War II, which 
was edited by Shu (1946) and published by the United 
Pictorial, took the standpoint of highlighting China’s 
contribution to World War II and adopted a more or 
less pro-KMT stance. As the organiser of the United 
Pictorial, Shu emphasised that by relying on the power 
of all Chinese people, China was able to continue 
fighting for 14 years before and during World War II. 
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Shu argued that in the first four years of the War of 
Resistance (1937-1941), China fought alone without 
the support of the Allies. Relying on the endurance of 
the Chinese people and the spirit of sharing a hatred of, 
and a determination to fight against, the Japanese 
invaders, China was able to sustain itself in the 
battlefield under disadvantages until the change in the 
international situation, that is, the outbreak of the 
Pacific War in 1941.  
This justified China obtaining the status of “the 
nation with the most senior qualification of fighting in 
the war among the members of the United Nations”. 
Besides, Shu pointed out that since China had fought 
the Axis Power for the longest period of time, had 
suffered the largest number of casualties, and had 
successfully contained numerous numbers of the 
Allies’ enemy, namely the Japanese armies, this 
justified the rise in China’s status during the war. Shu 
also noted two points: Firstly, Britain and the U.S. 
abolished their extra-territorial rights in China and 
returned leased territories to China. Secondly, during 
the Cairo Conference in 1941, both Britain and the 
U.S. had recognised China’s right to restore its 
sovereignty over Taiwan and Manchuria. Shu 
commented that: “The bleeding of our blood is not 
worth nothing”. However, Shu’s work did not mention 
the secret agreement made by the U.S.S.R., the U.S. 
and Britain at the Yalta Conference, which in fact 
showed that China’s status as one of the “Big Four 
Powers” with the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and Britain was 
not true in reality. Instead, Shu put the fault on 
China’s side, in that it did not fulfill the task of 
rebuilding the nation during the war due to various 
political and economic reasons. Besides, Shu 
condemned the outbreak of civil war after World War 
II which destroyed the pride established during the 
War of Resistance. Shu argued that if China did not 
stop the civil war immediately, she would soon revert 
to the status of other nation’s colonies and the victim 
of invasion, and would continue to be the slave of 
other nations (Shu 1946).  
RETELLING HISTORY IN A CHINESE 
CONTEXT: THE CHINESE TRANSLATION 
OF FOREIGN WORKS ON WORLD WAR II   
Our Enemy Japan (Riben Neimu) 
Our Enemy Japan, published in 1942, was written by 
Wilfrid Fleisher, an American correspondent of the 
New York Herald Tribune, who had been stationed in 
Japan for 17 years. The aims of the book, as recounted 
in Fleisher’s original preface, were to tell Americans 
what sort of people they were fighting against, to 
explain the military mindset of the Japanese who had 
long conceived the dream of conquering Asia, the 
strength of Japan’s army and navy, and the weakness 
of its economic position (Fleisher 1944). Our Enemy 
Japan contains nine chapters which discuss the rise of 
Japan since the opening by the American Commodore 
Perry in 1853, the rise of militarism, relations with 
Germany, Japanese leaders, the Japanese army and 
navy, the economic position, the Washington 
negotiations between Japan and the U.S. before the 
Pacific War, and the attack on Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941. The book also contains appendices 
consisting of American diplomatic and political 
documents regarding U.S.-Japanese relations.  
The Chinese translation of Our Enemy Japan was 
called Riben Neimu (The Inside Story of Japan) and 
was translated by Tung Defang and published by the 
Department of History and Politics of the Ministry of 
Defense of China in September 1946. Since the 
contents essentially focused on Japan, apart from the 
appendices which were deleted in the Chinese version 
because it was targeting the general public as its 
audience, the book was basically a direct translation of 
Fleisher’s work. However, the book preface written by 
Wu Shi, the publisher’s reader and a member of the 
general staff of the Ministry of Defense, still showed 
the KMT government’s standpoint regarding the 
reasons for the defeat of Japan in the war. Wu pointed 
out that some of the commentaries regarding the 
defeat and surrender of Japan were due to the 
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bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with American 
nuclear weapons. Wu argued that the defeat of Japan 
began with the invasion of China in the Mukden 
Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1931 
and 1937 respectively, and was confirmed by the Pearl 
Harbor Attack in 1941. The first main reason for 
Japan’s defeat was that it had started the war with 
unrighteous aims which guaranteed her defeat. The 
second important reason, as Wu said, was Japan “as a 
nation of a small territorial size and population 
becoming the enemy of a nation with a large territorial 
size and population; and a nation with poor economic 
resources becoming the enemy of a nation with 
abundant economic resources”. The former and later 
enemies of Japan in fact referred to China and U.S. 
respectively. Wu even argued that even though 
Japan’s national power was as strong as Germany’s, 
he concluded that the final fate of Germany, or even 
Napoleon Bonaparte and Julius Caesar who were also 
conquerors in their own time, were unsatisfactory. 
Quoting traditional Chinese history wisdom, Wu 
argued that there were many people in history who 
were so-called “unscrupulous heroes”, in that taking 
the role of dictator and conqueror, or militarism and 
an aggressive foreign policy in the modern sense, 
finally guaranteed their defeat in the end. In this 
regard, Wu supported the publication of Our Enemy 
Japan, as the way to promote traditional Chinese 
national ethic, that is to say, establishing friendly 
peaceful relationship with its neighbors (Fleisher 
1947). In other words, China was portrayed as a large 
and traditionally peaceful nation, which accounted for 
its defeat of Japan in World War II.  
Regardless of the portrait of China as a peaceful 
nation, the reason for the translation of foreign works 
about Japanese political and military development 
before World War II was well illustrated by the 
translator’s preface in Shōzō Mori’s book, Xuanfeng 
Er Shi Nian: Riben Jie Jin Neimu (The Whirlwind for 
Twenty Years: The Inside Story of Japan in Shōwa’s 
Period):  
Japan is defeated today, but we Chinese, who were the 
victims most devastated by Japanese imperialist invasion, 
should not forget about the past of Japan easily. We should 
remember well that Japanese calculations over China, were a 
long-lasting conspiracy…  
The revival of Japan may take thirty to fifty years, but 
for the sake of preventing the rise of Japan again, especially 
the success of Japan’s present conspiracy of “finding 
reincarnation in another’s corpse”, we not only need to be on 
the alert, but also need to catch up with the development of 
Japan in the period of thirty of fifty years. 
In order to achieve the above aim, the first criteria is that 
we must understand the real reasons for the defeat of Japan 
in the war. We must understand about the past twenty years, 
especially the internal political situation in Japan in the last 
ten years… (Mori 1946) 
Therefore, the publication of translations of the 
works written by American and Japanese authors 
about Japan’s political, economic and military 
development aimed to provide knowledge to Chinese 
readers in two areas: first, to prevent the revival of 
Japanese militarism; and second, the wish for the 
revival of China’s national power after World War II, 
so that it would not again be a victim of Japanese 
militarism in the future.   
The Stilwell Papers (Shi Di Wei Riji) 
The Stilwell Papers, was a collection from Joseph 
Stilwell’s diary covering the period of time from the 
outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 to his 
being relieved of his duty as the American Chief of 
Staff to the Chiang Kai-shek’s government in China in 
October 1944. They were edited by Theodore H. 
White, a famous American correspondent for Time 
Magazine in wartime China, who also exposed the 
news of the famine in Henan province in 1943 and the 
failure of the KMT government to provide relief to the 
victims. White continued to report on the weakness of 
the KMT army in fighting against the Japanese army, 
which was contrary to the wartime propaganda policy 
of the Allies. The Stilwell Papers showed the role of 
Stilwell in leading Chinese armies in the campaign 
fought against the Japanese in Burma from 1942 to 
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1944, plus his narratives about the Chiang Kai-shek’s 
government that revealed the root of the so-called 
“Stilwell Crisis”, which marked a direct confrontation 
and argument between Stilwell and Chiang. Chiang 
could not endure his military leadership being 
overtaken by Stilwell and American president 
Franklin Roosevelt was eventually forced to replace 
Stilwell with Albert C. Wedemeyer for the sake of the 
unity between China and the U.S. in fighting the 
Japanese. The Stilwell Papers were published in New 
York in 1948 while its partial Chinese translation, 
called Shi Di Wei Riji (The Dairy of Joseph Stilwell), 
was published in Shanghai in December 1948.  
Shanghai was still under the control of the KMT 
government despite the coming of complete defeat of 
the KMT forces by the Chinese communists in the 
civil war, therefore chapter 10 of the original book, 
entitled “Chiang Kai-shek and His Government”, was 
revised in the Chinese translation. The main 
differences, through textual analysis, were revealed to 
be as follows: 
Firstly, the sub-section title which was originally written 
as “Chiang Kai-shek”, was “This guy XXX” (XXX zhe ge 
ren) in the translated version. Besides, in the original main 
text, if it mentioned the name “Chiang Kai-shek”, it was 
“XXX” in the translated version; 
Secondly, the original version wrote about Stilwell’s 
faith in Chinese soldiers and Chinese people as 
“fundamentally great, democratic, misgoverned. No bars of 
caste or religion… Honest, frugal, industrious, cheerful, 
independent, tolerant, friendly, courteous”. The translated 
version kept all the above mentioned good qualities except 
“misgoverned”, which was replaced with “boundless 
prospects”. 
Thirdly, the entire sub-section about the weakness of the 
Chinese army in the original text was deleted from the 
section. For example, Stilwell wrote “the average strength 
per division instead of 10,000 is not more than 5,000… the 
troops are unpaid, unfed, shot with sickness and 
malnutrition… conscription is so-and-so” and so on, 
concluding: “How would you start to make such an army 
effective?”. 
Fourthly, the entire sub-section “Philosophy as Applied 
to Supply” was deleted in the translated version. Stilwell 
criticised American support of the regime of Chiang 
Kai-shek as in fact alien to the aim of fighting Nazi 
Germany, “We were fighting Germany to tear down the 
Nazi system—one-party government, supported by the 
Gestapo and headed by an unbalanced man with little 
education. We had plenty to say against such a system. 
China, our ally, was being run by a one-party government 
(the Kuomintang), support by a Gestapo (Tai Li’s 
organisation) and headed by an unbalanced man with little 
education”. This implied that Chiang was more or less the 
“Adolf Hitler” of China. (Stilwell 1948a, 1948b)  
Apart from the direct criticism of Chiang 
Kai-shek’s military leadership, the weakness of the 
Chinese army and one-party rule of the KMT, the 
translated version did not delete or revise Stilwell’s 
description of the differences between the KMT and 
the CCP as follows:  
[KMT] Corruption, neglect, chaos, economy, taxes, 
words and deeds. Hoarding, black market, trading with 
enemy. 
Communist program… reduce taxes, rents, interest. 
Raise production, and standard of living. Participate in 
government. Practice what they preach. (Stilwell 1948a, 
1948b) 
Yet, the Chinese translator or the publisher’s 
reader might have not understood “peanut” as a 
derogatory term referring to Chiang Kai-shek in 
Stilwell’s diary on September 7, 1944, so the 
translated text made an almost direct translation of the 
original text without using “XXX” to replace “peanut” 
(hua sheng mi) as follows:  
The G-mo calls. Date at 9:30, Hurley and Nelson at 
11:00. Why me, ahead of them? Love feast [italicized text is 
deleted in translated version]. Peanut went right into it, and 
told me that up to now my work had been 100 percent 
military—now, as Commander of the Chinese Army, it 
would be 60 percent military and 40 percent political. 
[He] said that if I used the Reds, they would have to 
acknowledge the authority of the National Military Council. 
He would advise me from time to time. He want no k'o ch'i 
(politenesses) between us. He had full confidence in me. 
Kidded about my saying Chinese commanders were no 
good--asked about commanders and divisions in Burma 
[italicized text is deleted in translated version]. (Stilwell 
1948a, 1948b)  
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Besides, any text implying or suggesting the 
overthrow of Chiang’s leadership, that is Chiang 
Kai-shek and chief-of-staff Ho Ying-chin, as the key 
to China’s success in defeating the last massive 
Japanese attack in mainland China as shown in 
Stilwell’s dairy entry on September 9, 1944, was 
totally deleted from the translated version as follows: 
Disaster approaching at Kweilin, nothing to stop the 
Japs—about 50,000 demoralized Chinese in the area against 
nine Jap divisions. Chinese have had no replacements. Jap 
units are filled up. It’s a mess and of course all they think of 
is what we can give them. Sun Fo want us to fly in American 
troops. Another wants weapons. What they ought to do is 
shoot the G-mo and Ho and the rest of the gang [italicized 
text is deleted in translated version]. (Stilwell 1948a, 1948b) 
Stilwell’s criticism of the American policy of 
supporting Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell’s 
unwillingness to stop alarmism about Chiang were 
deleted in the translated version: 
The picture of this little rattlesnake being backed up by a 
great democracy, and showing his backside in everything he 
says and does, would convulse you if you could get rid of 
your gall bladder. But to have to sit there and be dignified, 
instead of bursting into guffaws, is too much to ask for the 
pay I get. (Stilwell 1948a)  
Stilwell’s criticism, written in a letter sent to his 
wife on September 17, 1944, about British 
participation in the war against the Japanese, which 
simply aimed to regain Hong Kong and which in fact 
did not contribute a lot to American military 
operations, was also deleted from the translated 
version due to sensitivity over the Hong Kong 
question:  
I see that the Limeys are going to rush to our rescue in 
the Pacific. Like hell. They are going to continue this fight 
with their mouths. Four or five battleships will appear and 
about ten RAF planes will go to Australia but in twenty 
years the schoolbooks will be taking about “shoulder to 
shoulder” and “the Empire struck with all its might against 
the common enemy” and all that crap. The idea, of course, is 
to horn in at Hongkong again, and our Booby is sucked in. 
(Stilwell 1948a)  
Thunder out of China (Zhongguo   
Bao Feng Yu) 
Thunder out of China was written by Theodore H. 
White and Annalee Jacoby and published in 1946. 
Starting from early 1944, White began writing the 
book, which doubted the leadership of the KMT’s 
headman, Chiang Kai-shek, during the war in China. 
He argued that “the story of the China war is the story 
of the tragedy of Chiang Kai-shek, a man who 
misunderstood the war as badly as the Japanese or the 
Allied technicians of victory” (White and Jacoby 
1946). White also predicted the outbreak of civil war 
in China, and that Chiang would be defeated, even 
with American support. White argued that the Chinese 
communists would be successful in taking over China:  
The Communists, grew from an army of 85,000 to an 
army of a million, from the governors of 1,500,000 peasants 
to the masters of 90,000,000. The Communists used no 
magic; they knew the changes the people wanted, and they 
sponsored these changes… the Communists had the people 
with them, and with the people they made their own new 
justice. (White and Jacoby 1946)  
Since the standpoint of the publisher of Time 
Magazine, Henry Luce, was to support Chiang’s 
position, White finally resigned in 1945. As a result of 
his writing and alleged support for the Chinese 
communists, he became regarded as a left-wing 
activist by some anti-communist and right-wing 
conservative organisations in the U.S.  
As a result, in June 1949, the Chinese translation 
of Thunder out of China was published in Shanghai, 
which was then occupied by the Chinese Communist 
Forces. In the preface to the translated work, Edgar 
Snow, the author of Red Star Over China, praised the 
book for exposing the truth about American post-war 
policy toward China.  Firstly, apart from defeating 
the three Axis powers, the American intervention in 
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Asia did not further liberate all nations and peoples; 
instead, American power was used to restore the old 
order. Putting this objective in China’s case, Snow 
argued that the U.S. tried to maintain a social order 
with the type of “living fossil” supported by the KMT. 
Through the military ineffectiveness, political 
corruption and indefensible morality of the 
dictatorship of the KMT, Snow argued that the regime 
was totally unrelated to the military and political aims 
of American participation in World War II. Therefore, 
he thought that the Chinese communists, whom he 
called “dissenters”, were justified in obtaining a large 
amount of weapons from surrendered Japanese armies 
and in mobilising the people in order to establish a 
self-determination force, something that the U.S. 
should not intervene in. Therefore, Snow supported 
the narrative of White and Jacoby in the book which 
clearly showed the fault of Chiang Kai-shek in 
viewing Joseph Stilwell and the Chinese communists 
as a more dangerous enemy than Japan, as well as the 
relationship between Chiang and the other powerful 
clans of Sung, Hung and Chen’s families, and the 
American fault in stirring up civil war in China (White 
and Jacoby 1949).  
JUSTIFICATION OF POST­WAR POSITIONS: 
PRO­KMT AND PRO­CCP NARRATIVES   
Di Er Ci Da Zhan Huiyi Ge (The Song of 
Remembering World War II) was written by Yu 
Youren, a senior revolutionary and KMT member, and 
published in 1948. This booklet, which was in fact a 
long poem written by Yu commenting on World War 
II, reflected China’s mistakes in diplomatic policy 
during World War II as follows:  
I praise you, memorial to Cairo, the benefits of Cairo 
were in fact a lot. 
I surprise you, memorial to Crimea, the participants of 
Crimea Conference could not escape their responsibilities. 
I encourage you, memorial to Potsdam, heaven does not 
care about the Potsdam Declaration. (Yu 1948)  
The first sentence of the poem indicated that the 
Cairo Conference heralded the rise of the international 
status of China. The second sentence mentioned 
Crimea, referring to the Yalta Conference in February 
1945, where the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and Britain met 
secretly and betrayed the sovereign rights of China in 
exchange for the Soviet Union’s participation in the 
war against Japan. Therefore, Yu condemned such a 
secret conference and that all three countries should 
take responsibility. The third sentence mentioned 
Potsdam, referring to the Potsdam Declaration of July 
1945, which was long regarded by Chinese 
commentary as another occasion where China 
demonstrated its rising international status in the 
world and marked the fate of Japan and permanent 
world peace afterwards. Yu did not give an 
overwhelmingly positive comment on the Potsdam 
Conference, but instead implied that the Potsdam 
Declaration was useless in restoring China’s sovereign 
rights in Manchuria, Darlin and Port Arthur, once the 
Big Three Powers had already reached a secret 
agreement at the Yalta Conference.  
Yu even made a pessimistic judgment about the 
post-war situation of China, as follows: 
Remembering wild Divine Land, bursting into tears for 
eight years, everybody called for resistance towards 
invasions… both you [Japan] and I [China] were burnt to 
cinders, I am worse than you. Your defeat only needed 
self-reflection, my victory lead to turmoil of the whole 
nation. You retreated from the land “stolen from China”, but 
I scream for hunger and coldness, suffer from homeless and 
miserable situation, and cannot make production even with 
thousands acreages of fertile farmland. Having so-called 
relief materials, we receive such relief but difficult to satisfy 
our bellies and keep us warm. (Yu 1948)  
In other words, despite the recovery of 
extra-territorial rights and leased territories from the 
U.S. and Britain after the Cairo Conference, both 
countries made no extra sacrifice because they had 
already lost these privileges when Japan declared war 
on them in 1941. However, China’s victory did not 
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truly grant it the right of recovering all its sovereign 
rights, but worse it still relied on relief from America, 
making it seem that China was in a worse situation 
than defeated Japan. Reading between the lines, Yu’s 
comments in the poem showed that he and other 
members of the KMT government were dissatisfied 
with the international system which did not do justice 
in recognising the contribution of China in World  
War II.  
The pro-CCP periodicals and books more or less 
shared the same attitude of criticising the international 
system dominated by the Western nations, primarily 
Britain and U.S. The Chinese translated article, 
entitled Di Er Ci Shijie Da Zhan Milu (The Secret 
Record of World War II), published as a series in a 
pro-CCP periodical, Zhishi (Knowledge) from 
November 1948 to April 1949, more or less reflected 
the communist criticism of the international system 
dominated by leading capitalist countries like Britain 
and the U.S. before and after World War II.  
For example, the first article in the series called 
the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill as a 
“war peddler”, and criticised what he wrote in his 
memoir, The World War II, as simply justification of 
the British diplomatic policy in the inter-war period 
by distorting historical facts. The article condemned 
“British imperialism”, saying that it remained 
irresolute and hesitant during wartime, being chaotic 
during the time of failure and being arrogant during 
the time of victory. The article also criticised 
Churchill regarding the fact that everyone had 
forgotten his organising the military invasion of the 
Soviet Union (Ya Ma Xue Fu 1948).  
The third article in the series also criticised the 
argument by a “capitalist historian” which mentioned 
British and French appeasement policy toward 
German annexation of the Sudetenland of 
Czechoslovakia as being the way to save 
Czechoslovakia from the risk of invasion from 
Germany. The article argued that in fact this was a 
conspiracy to divert Hitler’s aggression to the East, 
that is, the Soviet Union (Mi Kai Luo Fu 1948). 
The sixth article in the series also gave an 
assurance that the secret activities of American 
chemical enterprises in supporting the re-militarisation 
of Germany to make a profit in the future war was one 
of the main causes of World War II (Lu Bin Si Tan 
1949).  
The book Di Er Ci Shijie Da Zhan (The Second 
World War), written by Xu Xian and published by 
left-wing publisher, the Joint Publishing Company, in 
1949, shared the same attitude of criticising some 
British and American “anti-revolutionaries” who took 
advantage of the death of American president Franklin 
Roosevelt. In doing so they did not fulfill the 
agreement made at the Yalta Conference that 
recognised the establishment of the government of 
Poland by the exiled Polish government in the Soviet 
Union, and advocated allowing the exiled Polish 
government in London take charge of the future 
Polish government (Xu 1949). In short, the pro-CCP 
or left-wing authors of the history of World War II 
were skeptical about the existing international system 
dominated by capitalist countries which they believed 
had fuelled the outbreak of World War II.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This preliminary study of the published books and 
articles about the history of World War II published in 
China from 1945 to 1949 shows the politicisation of 
the historical narrative of events, directly related to 
China. This was true both in the case of pro-KMT 
authors who did not accept the criticism of the faults 
of Chiang Kai-shek or China in World War II, and the 
U.S.S.R., in the case of pro-CCP authors. The 
pro-CCP writers had already adopted the mindset of 
the Cold War in reviewing the course of World War II, 
which they thought was rooted in the conspiracy of 
the capitalist bloc in threatening the genuine 
international peace advocated by the communist bloc. 
Besides, the historical narrative also shows the 
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reflection of some Chinese authors about Chiang’s 
stance in the Stilwell crisis, which accounted for the 
final betrayal of China’s sovereign rights in the Yalta 
Conference. In other words, Chinese historical writing 
about World War II not only acted as the justification 
for the victory and international respect China should 
enjoy after the war, but also as the lesson for China’s 
future development in the post-war period.  
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